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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. On appeal Plaintiff, American Rural Cellular (hereinafter 
ARC), urges a version of facts contradictory to those found by the 
Court to have been presented at trial. The primary issue on appeal 
is whether, after marshalling all the evidence in support of the 
trial court's Findings of Fact, the findings are against the clear 
weight of the evidence. 
2. Whether the trial court properly concluded that ARC 
should not be allowed to recuse the trial judge when it failed to 
comply with Rule 63 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
also waited until after ARC received an unfavorable ruling before 
raising the claim of appearance of impropriety. 
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing 
to allow ARC a new trial more than two years after the trial, on 
the assertion that new evidence has been developed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case involved a two day trial in which extensive 
testimony and documents were received into evidence. The court 
made findings based on that evidence which ARC now challenges on 
appeal. In such a case, the standard of review is strictly limited 
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to whether, after marshalling all of the evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings, the findings are so lacking in support as 
to be against the clear weight of the evidence. 4447 Associates v. 
First Security Financial, 889 P.2d 467, 471 (Utah App. 1995), 
Jacobs v. Hafen, 875 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah App. 1994), Saunders v. 
Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991), Prudential Capital Group v. 
Matt son, 802 P.2d 105, 106 (Utah App. 1990), 5 0 W. Broadway v. 
Redevelopment Agency, 784 P.2d 1162, 1171 (Utah 1989) and Grayson 
Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989) . 
On issue number two, whether ARC failed to follow the 
provisions of Rule 63 (b) and also waived its right to recuse the 
Judge, the standard of review is correctness. Jones, Waldo, et al. 
v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1996), Standard Federal Savings and 
Loan Assoc, v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136, 1137 (Utah 1991), 
Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 78 9 
P.2d 24, 25-26 (Utah 1990), State ex rel. Division of Consumer 
Protection v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 
1990), and Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
On issue number three, whether the court correctly refused to 
grant a new trial, the standard is whether the court below abused 
its discretion. A trial court's grant or denial of a motion for a 
new trial will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of 
discretion. In re Estate of Justheim, 824 P.2d 432, 433 (Utah App. 
2 
1991), Erikson v. Wasatch Manor, Inc.. 802 P.2d 1323, 1326-27 (Utah 
App. 1990) and Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Utah 
1988) . 
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the 
Supreme Court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-6(7)(c) 
(7) The following persons are excepted from licensure 
under this chapter and may engage in the construction 
trades subject to these circumstances and limitations: 
(c) public utilities operating under the rule 
of the Public Service Commission on 
construction work incidental to their own 
business 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(19)(a) 
"Public Utility" includes every common carrier, gas 
corporation, electrical corporation, wholesale electrical 
cooperative, telephone corporation, telegraph 
corporation, water corporation, sewerage corporation, 
heat corporation, independent energy producer not 
described in Subsection (e), and warehouseman where the 
service is performed for, or the commodity delivered to, 
the public generally, or in the case of a gas corporation 
or electrical corporation where the gas or electricity is 
sold or furnished to any member or consumer within the 
state for domestic, commercial, or industrial use. 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(29) 
"Telephone corporation" includes every corporation and 
person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning, 
controlling, operating, or managing any telephone line 
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for public service within this state, provided, however, 
that all corporations, partnerships, or firms providing 
intrastate cellular telephone service shall cease to be 
"telephone corporations" nine months after both the wire-
line and the nonwire-line cellular service providers have 
been issued covering licenses by the Federal 
Communications Commission. It does not include any 
person which provides, on a resale bases, any telephone 
or telecommunication service which is purchased from a 
telephone corporation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(30) 
"Telephone Line" includes all conduits, ducts, poles, 
wires, cables, instruments, and appliances, and all other 
real estate, fixtures, and personal property owned, 
controlled, operated, or managed in connection with or to 
facilitate communication by telephone whether that 
communication is had with or without the use of 
transmission wires. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-1(1) (c) 
(1) Except by consent of all parties, no justice, judge, or 
justice court judge may sit or act in any action or 
proceeding: 
(c) when he has been attorney or counsel for either party 
in the action or proceeding. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 
Except as provided in Section 38-11-107, in any action brought 
to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party 
shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to 
be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the 
action. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 63(b) 
(b) Disqualification. Whenever a party to any action or 
proceeding, civil or criminal, or his attorney shall make and 
file an affidavit that the judge before whom such action or 
proceeding is to be tried or heard has a bias or prejudice, 
either against such party or his attorney or in favor of any 
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opposite party to the suit, such judge shall proceed no 
further therein, except to call in another judge to hear and 
determine the matter. 
Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for 
the belief that such bias or prejudice exists, and shall be 
filed as soon as practicable after the case has been assigned 
or such bias or prejudice is known. If the judge against whom 
the affidavit is directed questions the sufficiency of the 
affidavit, he shall enter an order directing that a copy 
thereof be forthwith certified to another judge (naming him) 
of the same court or of a court of like jurisdiction, which 
judge shall then pass upon the legal sufficiency of the 
affidavit. If the judge against whom the affidavit is 
directed does not question the legal sufficiency of the 
affidavit, or if the judge to whom the affidavit is certified 
finds that it is legally sufficient, another judge must be 
called in to try the case or determine the matter in question. 
No party shall be entitled in any case to file more than one 
affidavit; and no such affidavit shall be filed unless 
accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record that such 
affidavit and application are made in good faith. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new 
trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all 
or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; 
provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment 
if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend 
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings 
and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party 
making the application, which he could not, wich 
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the 
trial. 
(b) Time for Motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served 
not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; Time for Filing. When the application for a 
new trial is made under Subdivision (a) (1), (2), (3), or (4), 
it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a 
new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with 
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the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within 
which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served 
may be extended for an additional period not exceeding 2 0 days 
either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties by 
written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case, 
ARC hired Defendant, Systems Communication Corporation 
(hereinafter Syscom) to work with it in building and operating a 
cellular telephone company. Syscom was to be compensated by 
payment of a "service fee" of $10,000.00 per month both during the 
building and the operation of the company. Syscom was also to 
receive 10% of the gross revenue and 5% of the sales price when the 
company is sold. Before the facilities were even completed, ARC 
ceased normal communications with Syscom and filed this action to 
terminate the agreement. Syscom counterclaimed for services 
rendered and monies advanced and unpaid. ARC admitted that the 
monies were owed, that the work was satisfactory, but claimed 
Syscom should not recover because it was not a licensed contractor. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition at Trial Court, 
A two day trial to the court was held. The trial court 
terminated the parties' agreements and entered judgment for the 
monies owed to Syscom. ARC appealed the trial court's Judgment to 
the Utah Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals remanded with 
instruction to the trial court to make additional and more specific 
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Findings of Fact. The trial court reviewed the file, the 
transcript of the trial, proposed findings and other input from 
counsel, and the courts notes from the trial and made extensive 
additional findings consisting of sixty-three separate paragraphs 
and Conclusions of Law, and entered a Judgment based on those 
findings. ARC then filed motions to recuse counsel for Syscom, to 
recuse the Judge and to reopen the case or grant a new trial. All 
motions were denied. This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Syscom adopts as its statement of facts, the facts found by 
the court and included in its signed Findings of Fact. Pertinent 
parts of those findings are set forth below. 
1. The Plaintiff, American Rural Cellular, Inc. (ARC), is a 
Delaware Corporation which has experience in constructing cellular 
telephone systems in Florida and in Pennsylvania. (T. 3, 266-267, 
R. 320). (Finding of Fact No.l). 
2. In 1989, ARC won a Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) lottery which entitled it to construct and operate a cellular 
telephone system in eastern Utah. (T. 11, 234, 252) . (Finding of 
Fact No. 2). 
3. ARC was required to have part of the telephone system 
built and in operation by a specific date or it would forfeit the 
FCC license. (T. 106, 150-151, 236). (Finding of Fact No. 3). 
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4. Defendant/Counterclaimant, Systems Communications 
Corporation, (Syscom) is a Utah Corporation operating in eastern 
Utah. (T. 4, 232). (Finding of Fact No. 4). 
5. Syscom is a wireless telephone and radio communication 
company which is in the business of building, equipping, and 
operating radio and telephone transmission towers for its telephone 
and radio customers. (T. 232). (Finding of Fact No. 5). 
6. Defendants hold NABER certified two-way radio technician 
licenses numbered 1868 (Neal M. Sorensen) and 1869 (Rodney D. 
Hauer). (T. 230, Ex. 1 and 75). (Finding of Fact No. 6). 
7. In 1989, Plaintiff approached Defendant Neal Sorensen, 
President of Systems Communications Corporation, seeking help in 
constructing and operating the cellular telephone system it had 
obtained a license for in the FCC lottery. (T. 11-12, 232-234). 
(Finding of Fact No. 7). 
8. ARC also sought Syscom's help in finding money with which 
to build the system. (T. 24, 243). (Finding of Fact No. 8). 
9. ARC first hired a law firm and engineering firm from the 
eastern United States to design and construct the system. (T. 12, 
39, 234-235, 237). (Finding of Fact No. 9). 
10. When ARC had a falling out with the law and engineering 
firm, ARC came to Mr. Sorensen at Syscom, and asked for help in 
putting in place the physical facilities, arranging licenses, and 
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interconnects, and operating the cellular telephone system. (T. 
237) . (Finding of Fact No. 10) . 
11. ARC came to Syscom for help in saving the FCC license and 
creating the cellular telephone company because of Syscom's 
experience and expertise in building and operating telephone and 
radio communication systems. (T. 20-21, 236-237) . Finding of Fact 
No. 11). 
12. Syscom did not hold itself out as a licensed contractor 
in the construction trades and ARC did not come to Syscom because 
it considered it a licensed contractor. (T. 21, 94, 235) . The 
people initially hired by ARC to create the telephone company were 
not licensed contractors in Utah, or any other state, but rather 
were attorneys and engineers. (T. 233-235) . (Finding of Fact No. 
12) . 
13. Syscom agreed to help and commenced immediately working 
with ARC'S engineers and others on selecting sites for radio towers 
and other facilities and introduced ARC to Motorola, which agreed 
to provide the money for the acquisition of the equipment and 
construction of the facilities in which the equipment would be 
placed. (T. 234, 243). (Finding of Fact No. 13). 
14. Mr. Sorensen, under guidance and direction from engineers 
hired by ARC, located lands for cell sites, secured the lands, and 
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hired contractors to construct buildings. (T. 234, 248-249). 
(Finding of Fact No. 14). 
15. Uintah Engineering and Land Surveying, Inc. was hired to 
do surveying in establishing corners and locating the sites where 
the different facilities were to be constructed. (T. 242-243). 
(Finding of Fact No. 15) . 
16. Dennis Martinsen, working under the Utah Contractors 
license of Martinsen Construction License number 0000151826, did 
the construction of the buildings and the base for the towers. The 
electrical work was performed by D & D Electric, which holds 
license No. 0000444360. Any work performed by Syscom employees on 
the buildings, was under the direction and control of Martinsen. 
(T. 183, 227-228, R. 317-318). (Finding of Fact No. 16). 
17. Syscom erected the radio towers pursuant to the 
specifications of Plaintiff's engineers and in accordance with FCC 
regulations. Plaintiff obtained the necessary permits from the FCC 
since Plaintiff was the holder of the cellular license. (T. 251-
253). (Finding of Fact No. 17). 
18. Eventually, Syscom and ARC signed a sales agreement which 
provided that Syscom would sell telephone equipment for ARC on a 
commission basis. (T. 55, 127). (Finding of Fact No. 18). 
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19. Syscom made sales of cellular equipment under the sales 
agreement, but has not been paid $2,3 96.72 owing it under the terms 
of that agreement. (Ex. 30 and 31). (Finding of Fact No. 19). 
20. ARC had Neal Sorensen of Systems Communications 
Corporation, attend training in several cities at ARC'S expense. 
(T. 125-126). (Finding of Fact No. 20). 
21. After Syscom began its work, Syscom and ARC started 
working on agreements to put in writing their respective duties, 
rights, and responsibilities with respect to the construction, 
operation, maintenance, and rights to income from the system. (T. 
12-13, 244-245). (Finding of Fact No. 21). 
22. As the work progressed, a document entitled "Management 
Agreement" was drafted by ARC, setting forth its proposal about how 
the parties would construct and manage the cellular telephone 
system authorized by the FCC, and how profits would be divided. 
(T. 244-245). (Finding of Fact No. 22). 
23. The recitals of the Management Agreement, particularly 
Paragraph B, recite that Syscom has been in the communication 
business for more than nine years having engaged in the 
installation and servicing of two-way and microwave equipment, the 
operation of a private paging system, and the leasing of 
communication sites to private radio licensees, and thereby has 
acquired considerable business experience, name familiarity, and 
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business knowledge in the telecommunications industry in the Permit 
Area. (Ex. 1 and 75). (Finding of Fact No. 23) . 
24. The Management Agreement also provides in Paragraph C of 
the Recitals on the first page of the Management Agreement that 
Syscom holds an FCC private radio license and is accredited by the 
National Association of Business and Radio Users. Paragraph E of 
the Agreement, provides that ARC wanted to take advantage of the 
knowledge, experience, business and community context and assets of 
Syscom in order to engage in the business of providing cellular 
radio telecommunication services in the Permit Area. (Ex. 1 and 
75) . (Finding of Fact No. 24) . 
25. The Management Agreement does not recite that Syscom is 
a licensed contractor, nor did Syscom represent in any other way 
that it was licensed as a construction contractor. (Ex. 1 and 75) . 
(Finding of Fact No. 25) . 
26. The contract outlines the general duties of Syscom and 
particularly Paragraph 2(b) lists things which Syscom should do. 
(Ex. 1 and 75) . (Finding of Fact No. 26) . 
27. Syscom's duties "under ARC'S exclusive right of 
unfettered control over business assets, facilities, operations, 
and policy decisions," was to do the things as set forth in 
Paragraphs 3(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k), 
12 
and (1). Syscom worked on each of those areas of responsibility. 
(T. 250-257, 265-266, 303). (Finding of Fact No. 27). 
28. ARC, under the contract Section 5(b), was to execute such 
contracts as are recommended by Syscom and approved by ARC for the 
construction, maintenance and lawful operation of the cellular 
telecommunication system in the Permit Area. This is what was 
done. (T. 266), (Ex. 1 and 75), (R. at 319-323). (Finding of Fact 
No. 28). 
29. Syscom reviewed the proposed agreement and revised it 
sending it back to ARC. Several drafts of the Management Agreement 
were passed back and forth. (T. 237-238). (Finding of Fact No. 
29) . 
30. The work of putting together the cellular telephone 
company progressed and eventually, as the initial phase of setting 
up the cellular telephone system was nearing completion, one 
version of a Management Agreement was signed by Plaintiff and 
another was signed by Defendant. The parties went forward with the 
work as if they had agreed to the terms embodied in the Management 
Agreement. (T. 244-245, 247, 280-282). (Finding of Fact No. 30). 
31. Under the terms of the Management Agreement, Syscom had 
the responsibility to, "manage and implement the building of the 
system and operating it once built". Those responsibilities 
included operating, servicing, and maintaining all of the towers, 
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switches, terminals, and other facilities, sales and billing of 
customers, negotiating interconnections, arrangements with local 
wireline telephone systems, establishing written operating 
procedures, and selecting, training, and supervising technical 
sales and administrative personnel and many other duties. (T. 248-
251, Ex. 1 and 75). (Finding of Fact No. 31). 
32. For performing these functions, ARC agreed to pay Syscom 
a "service fee" of $10,000 per month plus 10% of the revenues from 
the system, minus certain deductions for taxes. The $10,000.00 per 
month management fee, although not called that by the parties, was 
substantially a fee for radio and telephone engineering and 
management services. (T. 127, 240-241, Ex. 1 and 75) . (Finding of 
Fact No. 32). 
33. ARC reserved the right to execute all agreements for 
construction, maintenance, and operation of the system. Everything 
that Syscom did was under ARC'S exclusive right of unfettered 
control over business assets, facilities, operations, and 
decisions. (Ex. 1 and 75). (Finding of Fact No. 33). 
34. Although the Management Agreement states that Syscom is 
an independent contractor, the agreement also states that ARC had 
the right to make all decisions and direct how the work was done in 
putting together and operating the telephone company. The parties' 
actions indicate their recognition that ARC was in total control 
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and could direct, and at times did direct, how work was to be 
performed and how the money was spent. (T. 133, 134). For 
example, communications about the details of the work took place 
nearly daily as the work progressed and ARC directed Syscom to 
withdraw monies and send the money to ARC in Florida, which Syscom 
did in a sum of $118,156.60. (T. 39, 85, 105, 115-116, 244, 254, 
269-273, Ex. 1 and 75). (Finding of Fact No. 34). 
35. In some ways, the relationship between the parties which 
existed was principal-agent. ARC had full control in all 
decisions. Syscom only had authority to recommend. (T. 247-248, 
Ex. 1 and 75). (Finding of Fact No. 35). 
36. In other ways, it was as if the parties were partners. 
Syscom put its own money into the project for telephone equipment 
and advances for other things. That, together with listing itself 
as owner on building permit applications and sharing gross business 
revenues and sales profits, made the relationship between the 
parties like a partnership. (T. 88-89, 238-239, 247, 260, 278-
2 79, Ex. 1 and 75). (Finding of Fact No. 36). 
37. Part of the money to be received by Syscom was ten (10%) 
percent of gross revenue and in the event the cellular telephone 
system is sold, Syscom is to receive five (5%) percent of the sales 
price. (T. 128, 247, Ex. 1 and 75). (Finding of Fact No. 37). 
15 
38. As Syscom went to work to put together the telephone 
company, Neal Sorensen and Marie Bagshaw, the contact person Syscom 
had with ARC, talked on the telephone three or four times a week, 
if not more often. (T. 85, 244). (Finding of Fact No. 38). 
39. Syscom was to be paid a fee called a service fee for its 
work in creating the new telephone company, which fee was the same 
during the construction period and the operation period. (T. 122) , 
(Ex. 1 and 75). (Finding of Fact No. 39). 
40. Plaintiff breached its covenant of good faith dealing by 
ceasing to communicate with the Defendant when Defendant was 
attempting to finish the cell sites and operate the system. This 
failure to communicate commenced several months prior to the 
termination of the agreement by Plaintiff. (T. 51, 86-87, 299-
301). (Finding of Fact No. 41). 
41. Defendant breached the agreement by advertising a 
competing product, however paragraph seven of the Management 
Agreement recognized that there would be some conflict between 
Systems Communications' existing radio business and the cellular 
business and entered into the agreement with this knowledge and 
expressed reference to that potential problem. The Court finds the 
breach to be minor. (T. 276-278, Ex. 1 and 75). (Finding of Fact 
No. 42). 
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42. The Defendant, Systems Communication Corporation, 
sincerely pursued the construction and management of the system in 
anticipation of and reliance on future expectations of profit. (T. 
247). (Finding of Fact No. 43). 
43. The Plaintiff, American Rural Cellular, Inc., received a 
completed and developed system at a reasonable price and was 
satisfied with the product. (T. 101, 106, 143). (Finding of Fact 
No. 44) . 
44. The Sales Agency Agreement signed by the parties enabled 
Syscom to participate in the sale of cellular telephones and states 
that it would do so as an independent contractor. (Ex. 23) . 
(Finding of Fact No. 45). 
45. Syscom's opportunities and responsibilities under the 
Sales Agent Agreement, involved the sale of cellular telephone 
equipment and its compensation was a commission, based on sales. 
(Ex. 23) . (Finding of Fact No. 50) . 
46. Plaintiff was satisfied with how the buildings and towers 
were constructed. (T. 106) . Plaintiff and its engineers 
supervised Syscom and approved the disbursement of funds from the 
various accounts. (Ex 1 and 75). (Finding of Fact No. 51). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. 
The trial court correctly decided that Syscom should be paid 
for its services in managing and implementing the installation and 
operation of the cellular telephone system. 
II. 
ARC'S motions to recuse the judge, to recuse opposing counsel 
and for a new trial were not timely, did not comply with the Rules 
of Civil Procedure and were properly denied. 
III. 
The award of attorneys fees by the trial court was required 
both by the contract between the parties and the statutory 
provisions governing mechanics liens. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT SYSCOM WAS NOT A CONTRACTOR 
UNDER THE LICENSING STATUTE IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE IN 
THE CASE. EVEN IF SYSCOM WERE A CONTRACTOR, IT QUALIFIES FOR 
STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW EXCEPTIONS. 
A. Defendant, Svscom is not a contractor as that term is used 
in the Construction Trades Licensing Act. 
ARC'S argument, that the court erred when it concluded that 
because Syscom was ARC'S agent it need not be licensed under the 
Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act, misses the mark and 
misstates the issue. The court specifically found that Syscom was 
not a contractor covered by the Act. (R. 1319, 1324, 1327) . That 
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conclusion was based on specific Findings of Fact including the 
following: 
1. Syscom's activities included sale of cellular telephone 
equipment on a commission basis. (Ex. 23). 
2. Syscom was to be paid a service fee for its work, which 
the fee was the same during the construction and the operational 
periods. (T. 122), (Ex. 1 and 75). 
3. Part of the money to be received by Syscom was 10% of 
gross revenue and 5% of sales price of the company. (T. 128, 247, 
Ex. 1 and 75). 
4. The parties talked on the telephone 3 or 4 times a week 
in putting together the telephone company. (7.85, 244) 
5. Cellcom had full control in all decisions, Syscom only 
had authority to recommend. (T. 247-248, Ex. 1 and 75, T. 133 & 
134) . 
6. ARC directed Syscom to withdraw moneys from the 
construction account and send those funds to ARC in Florida. (T. 
39, 85, 105, 115-116, 244, 254, 269-273, Ex. 1 & 75). 
7. ARC had the right to direct how the work was done in 
putting together and operating the telephone company. (T. 133, 
134) . 
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8. ARC reserved the right to execute all agreements for 
construction, maintenance, and operation of the telephone company. 
(Ex. 1 8c 75) . 
9. The $10,000.00 management fee was substantially for 
engineering and management type service. (T. 12 7, 240-241, Ex. 1 
& 75) . 
10. Syscom's responsibilities included operating, servicing, 
and maintaining all of the towers, switches, terminals, and other 
facilities, sales and billing of customers, negotiating 
interconnections arrangements with local telephone systems 
establishing written operating procedures, and selecting, training, 
and supervising technical and administrative personnel. (T. 248 -
251, Ex. 1 8c 75) . 
The work which Syscom did and which it agreed to do under the 
Management Agreement was not that of being a construction 
contractor. The Management Agreement recites the credentials ARC 
looked to Syscom to provide in the project. Paragraph E of the 
Agreement states that ARC wanted to take advantage of the knowledge 
and experience Syscom had in the telephone business gained from its 
years of experience in installing and servicing communication 
equipment in the permit area. (Ex. 1 and 75) . A reading of the 
Management Agreement describes the services which Syscom was to 
provide. Syscom did not hold itself out as a construction trades 
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contractor either in the recitals of the Management Agreement nor 
in any other way. Syscom's compensation was a service fee which 
was $10,000.00 per month both during the construction phase and the 
operation phase of the term of the agreement. Syscom did not bid 
to construct any part of the facilities. (T. 245-247), (R. 765-
676) . The contracts were to be entered into by Syscom on behalf of 
ARC. (Ex. 1, Paragraph 6.A(1)). 
Syscom was to share in the revenues of the system and in the 
event the system was sold, Syscom was to share in the sales price 
of the system. (Ex. 1 and 75) . In that sense, Syscom and ARC were 
partners or had a profit-sharing arrangement. The monies which 
Syscom claims from ARC are for non-payment of the management fee 
clearly spelled out in the Agreement and the services for which it 
was to be paid. The Agreement also indicates that ARC would pay 
for the construction and the out-of-pocket expenses incurred by 
Syscom. (Ex. 1 and 75) . The money in the bank accounts which 
Syscom managed for ARC was furnished by ARC and Syscom simply acted 
as the agent of ARC in performing the responsibilities set forth 
under the Agreement. 
The trial court specifically found that Syscom was not a 
contractor as that term is used in the Construction Trades 
Licensing Act. This finding was based on the activities Syscom 
performed and those called for under the Management Agreement. 
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Sysrom nid not hold itself out as a construction contractor ana ., t 
r - c :••• *- ;r--inn •"ontrac^o] "h*-1 trial court's 
conclusions that Syscoru wau n:.i-.--j ..*:;•; • •• : /^ - -..:, u-j"/ • 
part i cirap*- tha- - • instruct; i< ri contractor, onl\ supports the 
I .:.i; J , : ;.c;' • not a contractor under the 
Construction Trades Licensing Act.. 
b. American xural Cellular Inc. is not in the class of 
persons sought to be protected by the licensing requirement. 
'* " o m was v^i_ licensed under the construction 
trades licensing estate, an . t :'t--^ ; JP: :tia 
contracted wi:t Lt and should not now 0 1 illowen t-.; raise :.ms 
dene-- T-*-J'- " •;••- i -MiTrr^ 1" of cases, na^ stated 
that the tact trior i person :\: ..--. . . it::.--.' ^ ' 
bar recovery f^r wr-y-'k done when the person for which che work was 
perioral— = ; ; '•^ ''•",*ec " • - licensing 
statute. See American Rural Cellular m c . v. .--:y ^i- — ts 
Communicat ions Corp_.^ _ _et_ GLL^ _, ^9l; '" •• ' ' ;^': -'-' '-> ^t^ • 
199!?'• Motivated ManaqenitjUL iiu.ciuaLioiid^ - :->jreit :• inney and 
Isabelle Finney, h 4 P. 2d 4 67 tUtah, 'lu"7t . tmi Fillmore Products 
Western states Pavina ';;'- ". :;" -'c - --7. -89 (Urah 197' The 
Supreme Court saic •:: r : .u r lilmore riodu,/ -. • •-* 
this court has recognized the harshness of 
declaring contracts of non-licensees void or 
unenforceable. . . It is inequitable and unjust to rule 
as a matter of law on summary judgment that defendant can 
take the benefit of plaintiff's labor and refuse 1_^ ^-^ 
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for it. The general rule is that persons required to be 
licensed will not have their bargains enforced. The 
general rules still permit the Court to consider the 
merits of the particular case and avoid unreasonable 
penalties and forfeitures. 
Although many Courts yearn for a mechanically applicable 
rule, they have not made one in the present instance. 
Justice requires that the penalty should fit the crime; 
and justice and sound policy do not always require the 
enforcement of licensing statutes by large forfeitures 
going not to the state but repudiating defendants. Id at 
689 
In this case, licensed contractors and professionals were 
hired to survey, engineer, construct buildings and do electrical 
work. ARC did not look to Syscom for those skills or 
qualifications. The Utah courts have held that unless it is shown 
that the party against whom recovery is sought is within the class 
of persons whom the licensing statute is designed to protect, 
recovery will not be allowed. Govert Copier Painting v. Van 
Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163, 168 (UtahApp. 1990), George v. Oren Limited 
& Associates, 672 P.2d 732, 735 (Utah 1983), Heber Valley Truck v. 
Utah Coal & Energy, 611 P.2d 389, 391 (Utah 1980), Lignell v. Berg, 
593 P.2d 800, 805 (Utah 1979), Smith v. American Packing and 
Provision Co., 102 Utah 351, 130 P.2d 951 (1942). 
In this case, ARC was in charge of the project, reserved the 
right to make all decisions as to how the work proceeded and the 
right to direct expenditures of moneys. It did not rely on Syscom 
as an independent contractor. 
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C. Syscom is federally licensed to install and operate radio 
equipment. 
•r-;,,^  p:-r licenses held oy N>- t\ Sorensen and Rod Hauer referred 
'..<- - . . ••'::../'..",•••. -' "• '••• v"ir.3':'"4Pier.r Aoreement That 
Syscom people were
 : i censed .-;iiw wdo viie oi .... :. • ._< .JI.H Syscom was 
-- .:.T •" h-r ^ R C ^ r i requested to do the- w^rk for vwiich S y s c o m has 
• •• ;:aiiv.j i . ;.•':. •*..-. i persons whose 
activities are specifically licensed u.uier o: her st .»L u . .;: y 
* • " • 1! * :"h -\v. t!:^  '^nera.1 license requirement imposed 
. ? . ."icnrraciors. See who is d LUULI^;^^_^„ £i 'c.:in Statutes 
Requiring the Licensing of, or Imposing a License Tax Upon, a 
"Contractu! Wiu.:^ ...d Spec.:, f v m j_.t.hie Kinds of Contractors Involved, 
19 ALR 3d 140" • 19<f '.>. Where one is 1 j -:eii:—a i^ct- ;. , ^r-.-r^ 
the work involved h** nrnr prr.Mij sought f be given , \ " r :-'. ;ic 
Licensing StatuL*: ' r - ^ ;*r nave he~'d that 
failure to license ^ ' :\> tate i_evei *- ; f 
defense for paymen* t"» '^  - k don° . See Wallich v. Salkin, 2 1v ^ ai 
App. 2<j 1 b" , *j Ltd I . Repo. - . 
D. The bulk of the construction work done on these sites was 
done by Dennis Martinsen, a licensed contractor. 
Dennis Martinsen, working und^r * he 1 Jtah Contractors licence. 
M :t i' 1 .i nsen rnnstruction L -r^.F^ number 0000151826, did the 
construction • ; >.. - . ,. : • * • n^ 
electrical Wui:. \-.ir performed > ^.LecLj. ..c >, . . 
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license No. 0000444360. Any work performed by Syscom employees on 
the buildings, was under the direction and control of Martinsen. 
(T. 183, 227-228, R. 317-318). 
Syscom's role was to erect the radio towers, which it was 
licensed to do under federal law. The cases are numerous 
indicating that if the protection sought to be afforded the 
consumer is supplied in some other way, the defense of failure to 
license will not be raised. See Motivated Management International 
v. Finney, supra. 
E. The Trial Court Correctly Held That Syscom and the 
Enterprise Jointly Built By Syscom and ARC Was a Telephone 
Company Specifically Exempt From the Contractor Licensing 
Requirement. 
Utah Code Annotated § 58-55-6 imposes the requirement of a 
contractor's license. Subparagraph (7) of that section lists the 
exemptions and exceptions to that requirement. It states: 
The following persons are excepted from licensure under 
this chapter and may engage in the construction trade 
subject to these circumstances and limitations 
• • • • 
7(c) Public utilities operating under the rules of the 
Public Service Commission on construction work incidental 
to their own business. 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(19) (a) defines the term Public Utility as 
follows: 
Public utility includes every common carrier, gas 
corporation, electrical corporation, wholesale electric 
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cooperative . telephone corporation, telegraph 
corporat ior '"nde-r I i ni ng suppl ied. ) 
Telephone corporation is defined •>; iM ah Code Ann, § 54 2-1:29) as 
f ol lows .-
"Telephone corporation" includes ^ver;, corporation and 
person, their lessees, trustees and receivers, owning, 
controlling, operating, or managing any telephone line 
for public service within this state, 
Utah ' ru .-, ' '^l- il • ]* * -' ~\s f^ll'^ws: 
Telephone iin> "includes all conduits, viuct.j, poiey, 
wires, cables instruments, and appliances, and all other 
real estate, fixtures, and personal property owned, 
controlled, operated, or managed in connection with or to 
facilitate communication by telephone whether that 
communication is had with or without the use of 
transmission wires. 
r>' •-•, ^ i : :rilities since they are telephone 
companies operating .1 teiepii^ i:*.- . m e . 
Utah ^od^ :'^ -1 ' r.<l 2 ] 22 * he paragraph defining "telephone 
corpora:....-. -.;..- cellular telephone 
companies are " telephone corporations" i:\ facing 
.... provided however that 1 .. j. corporations, 
partnerships, or firms providing intrastate cellular 
telephone service shall cease to be telephone 
corporations nine months after both the wire-line and the 
nonwi.re~l.ine cellular service providers have been issued 
covering licenses by the Federal Communications 
Commi ssiori. 
1 I... .- : •"•' +_ O r6C^i:. t. til.. • ' ' ) . - :"• : ' '*" 2~"'\ r . ^ c r ^ p h 
29 of the statute ' hat ARC and Syscorn woi:-;eJ so ".aiM ;.v_. ,,/;e: 
construe: . : ... •-()- )-'] : '-6 \s § 54 -2-1 (29) 
states, prior to issuance of the license ah I I hf »•>:•: | >i iat ivi I 2 nine 
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months, the company is classified as a public utility in Utah. 
After the passage of nine months from the issuance of the FCC 
covering license, it is excluded from the definition of public 
utilities because it is regulated by the FCC and under federal law. 
As a public utility, Syscom and the system being constructed are 
exempt from construction trade licensing for work incidental to the 
business as provided in § 58-55-6(7) (c) . 
A company providing cellular telephone service cannot cease to 
be a telephone corporation nine months after licensing by the FCC 
if it is not a telephone corporation prior to the expiration of 
nine months. 
The trial court correctly concluded on the basis of the 
undisputed evidence that Syscom, and the telephone system being 
constructed by Syscom and ARC, were both public utilities and 
exempt from the contractor licensing statute. § 58-55-6 (7) (c) 
specifically exempts public utilities on construction work 
incidental to their own business, which would certainly exempt the 
work connected with the installation of the communications 
equipment which Syscom did in putting together the system with ARC. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY SAW ARC'S ATTEMPT TO RECUSE THE 
TRIAL COURT AS A LITIGATION TACTIC CALCULATED TO GET A NEW 
TRIAL AND CONCLUDED THAT ARC7 3 WAITING UNTIL RECEIVING AN 
UNFAVORABLE RULING CONSTITUTED A WAIVER AND FURTHER THAT THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 63(b) URCP WERE NOT MET. 
A. ARC did not follow Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure in attempting to recuse Judge Anderson. 
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ARC appeals the trial court's denial of ARC'S motion, to recuse 
I/HIK-V *• ' : :-;-rson. The moti^r v recuse was basec on <* claim 
that". ARC had discovered an agre^ »r.'- • • •II:-:C- w^ 
partner, John BeasL;ii had been hired no acv as an escrow agent by 
:.. . •: . i-.i M- .-. . received when Svscom aqreed to 
buy Meal Sorensen' •.• stock -iyscom. A\. ecu: :ii;---t: . n 
arranome::* presented a conf"! ici" or interest tor " idge Andeison who 
at. t:-tr L::I.- w..: . ~^-• •• * . • * del son did not 
know of: the agreement until • h* -^ notion, 
Rulf ui uhe Utaix Kales of Civil Procedure reads as 
follows: 
Whenever a par~y to any action or proceeding, civil or 
criminal, or his attorney shall make and file an 
affidavit that the judge before whom such action or 
proceeding is r o be tried or heard has a bias or 
prejudice, either against such party or his attorney or 
in favor of any opposite party to the suit, such judge 
shall proceed no further therein, except to ca.1.1 
another judge to hear and determine the matter. 
Every such affidavit shall state tl: le facts and the 
reasons for the belief that such bias or prejudice 
exists, and shall be filed as soon as practicable after 
the case has been assigned or such bias or prejudice is 
known. No party shall be entitled in any case to 
file more than one affidavit; and no such affidavit shall 
be filed unless accompanied, by a certificate ::>f counsel 
of record that such affidavit and application aire made in 
good f ai tl.. 
ARC did not file an affidavit as required by the Rule.. The 
i: i i] e x ' ^ n . - ••-•-- • - ,ir a p a r t y a l l e g i n g j u d i c i a l b i a s o r p r e j u d i c e m u s t 
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first file an affidavit to that effect. Wade v. Stangl, 869 P.2d 
9, 11 (Utah App. 1994). 
Furthermore, ARC did not file a Certificate of Counsel of 
Record that such affidavit and application are made in good faith. 
If for no other reasons, the Motion to Disqualify Judge Anderson 
was correctly denied for failure of ARC to follow the provisions of 
the Rule involved in the process of disqualifying a judge. 
There are reasons for the rule. The affidavit should set 
forth how and when the information came to the attention of the 
party seeking disqualification and the certificate of counsel is 
required to avoid frivolous disqualification proceedings. Since 
neither the affidavit nor the certificate as required by the rule 
were filed in this case, there was good reason to go no further in 
considering the requested disqualification. 
B. ARC'S Motion to Disqualify Judge Anderson was not timely. 
Timeliness is essential in filing a motion to disqualify. To 
be timely, a motion to disqualify should be filed at counsel's 
first opportunity after learning of the disqualifying facts. See 
Madsen v. Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Assn., 767 P.2d 538 
(Utah 1988) wherein the Supreme Court found that a 39-day delay at 
a critical juncture in the proceedings was not a timely filing. 
The court there suggested that 10 days should be ample time to 
prepare and file such an affidavit and certificate especially if 
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the case is in advanced stage. ^ee also Onyeabor v. Fro 
K G o 11 ;IH, _ . _.. AJ A 5 2 6--/"- ' • * a I A r-p. 1-9 0 "• . Birch v. 
Birch '7 "; : :- -. , . ; .- ^.pasi^Le-s _^^_ 
Dinsdale, 121 Arab ••;:;, 242 P.2d 297 (1962 
}-; . ::. . ,* . "X- ^ -s,: vA v A- ' proceedings after 
knowledge of the alleged giouna.; toi. ai^qu.;. .:i.a:. :. : : • *" d 
• ; "iu* * o asser1 disqualification at. si.cn a lave stage See 
Waiver or .LOSS of :-,IJ:IU ^ ^isoaciiu.i/ JU-J-.--: ;:;. £articipat ion in 
Proceedings, ;•'•; ALR -Ah Q"-r. ; AJH " see also Form and Requirements 
s± ••A:i',:Li:ai:t; 1^^ 1 Affidavit of Disqualification of Trial Judge 
under 28 USC §144 : • A" "• ' • , ...wellness or 
Affidavit of Disqualification of Trial Judge under 28 USC §144, 2 0 
Ai- * learnei A r -ie existen^^ n: . ..
 if, -- ~^ ; 
A - ^ v ^ n N^ -1 •< rensen and Syscom not later - har: .July : i y -
Disqualify Judg^ Ar.ierson Ai^.i Octobei
 lt : 
knowied~T' * * igreement .• ;east as e.s: :y is . uly, JA^-^, ARC 
chose i • ; 1 ~'o\' A - f i ca* \ ^ r upt~ i "i 
October, 19iA Be: ween the cunt- IL L^ariu.a ^: ;_.„> agree* 
II1*1 t imp • • • -• *-^ - .".idJo and submitted its proposed 
Findings . ..-...• * * enforce a 
settlement agreement . filed t: wc - motions A : new Liiais, and tiled 
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a motion to amend and reconsider Judge Anderson's decision. Only 
after an unfavorable decision and rulings denying those motions, 
did ARC file its motion to disqualify. It is well recognized that 
an application for the disqualification of a trial judge must be 
filed at the earliest opportunity. The courts generally apply this 
rule with strictness against a person who, having a knowledge of 
the facts, does not seek to disqualify the judge until an 
unfavorable ruling has been made. See Madsen v. Prudential Federal 
Savings and Loan Assn., 767 P.2d 538, 543 (Utah 1988) . The 
provisions of the rule itself require that the affidavit be filed 
as soon as practicable after the bias or prejudice is known. Such 
has not been the case here. 
The fact that there existed an agreement wherein stock was 
held in an escrow in a transaction between Neal M Sorensen and 
Syscom, reasonably should have been known to ARC near the beginning 
of this law suit. The transaction was the subject of inquiry as 
early as the time of Neal M Sorensen's deposition on May 1, 1992. 
See deposition of Neal M Sorensen, Addendum A. Extensive 
depositions were taken, materials and documents were produced for 
examination at depositions, and interrogatories were answered. 
There was ample opportunity to know what is now alleged as the 
basis for disqualification. Even if the first knowledge was in 
July of 1995, it can not be said that the motion was timely filed 
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when it was not filed until montns later, after several adverse 
ru] iriqs . The ^ <~^ jrf -"irrect I y rn'.^ ci against ARC'S Motion to Recuse, 
o n I. i^n . •• • 
C. The motion to recuse Judge Anderson was correctly denied 
because Judge Anderson had no actual knowledge of the contract 
upon which the Motion to Disqualify is predicated. 
Urit i v . • • ough' .-' s 
Motion to Disqualify, Judge Anderson han :v :• knowledge r the 
, '- f.i r-pfoj;p
 ( j-* -^  (7on 1 d n.ot -H a"\fi~' h een 
influenced ;- .; . • . ^ .0x^11 oy r. n^i. ;a,".4 ....;: .. .: i^r:_ .. ,-.; e 
case where a iurvi •• ,-• in i:arrM have a conflict of interest bu; 113 
• . • '
 ;
 •:!--- r -r - uLuation 
nas been rule-.: .. .Supreme Court .. * • -A.
 tl aimless. See 
Anderton v. Montgomery, ^ 7 p.2d M2S (Mt-ah -. 98 0"* . 
Judge anc-ji'son ; ..; • .- ^L- -:^  . * . •• noi ha1; ' e 
-any Knowledge that '-.ic- "J.JW ': :-:• \-..v\ .r. •. revolvement with the 
pai : t::i es. (R 1 459 2 • 160) . See the Affidavits of John C. Beaslin 
and Rod Hauer (R ] 2] : 1 22 6) . 
Neither Judge J ohn Anderson nor John C. Beas] in drafted, the 
Stoc] : Pi 11: chase Agxeement 'I'll<°" agreement was drafted by Clark B 
Allred, representing Neal M iJorensen. (R I,!H) , 
Section r": : • . 'ode Armotai ed relied upon by ARC, 
pi: o * n des tl lat <sv ; • ion 
"when he has been attorney <„;L counse- : ^ e-Lii^: party in 
the actier ^^ ^roceedina, '! 
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Judge John Anderson has been neither attorney or counsel for 
Syscom, Rod Hauer, or Neal M Sorensen. Unknown to him, his partner 
Mr. Beaslin agreed to hold stock as a third party escrow agent in 
a transaction involving Neal Sorensen and Syscom. The section 
relied upon should not apply to the case at hand. (R. 1213 and 
1214) . 
ARC should be estopped from filing its Motion to Recuse 
because it waited until after an adverse decision before raising 
this issue when all of the facts relating to the stock purchase 
agreement were known to ARC prior to the time Judge Anderson issued 
his ruling in this case. ARC is on record of having received a 
copy of the agreement prior to the time ARC filed its proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as was testified to by both 
Mr. Stringham and Mr. Hauer at the hearing the Court held in this 
case on ARC'S Motion to Enforce a Settlement Agreement, which 
hearing was held on the 21st day of August, 1995. 
This, coupled with the other Motions filed, demonstrates 
clearly that the Motion to Disqualify was not filed because Judge 
John Anderson was prejudice or even that ARC believed the escrow of 
stock had any influence on Judge Anderson's decision in the case. 
It was simply an effort to avoid paying Syscom for work performed 
and to obtain a new trial. If a ruling favorable to ARC had been 
entered there would have been no motion to recuse. 
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 T H E C 0 U R T P R 0 P E R L Y R E J E C T E D A R C # S A T T E M P T T Q R E 0 P E N 0 R 0 B T A I N 
A NEW TRIAL BASED ON EVIDENCE DEVELOPED AFTER THE TRIAL AND 
EVENTS OCCURRING AFTER THE TRIAL. 
ARC s r Ic 't:i :: i 1 to Reopen the case was f :i ] e • :i fen n: years ai id se : > ei i 
months after the fil ing of the original conn-.Lam; . t. ,;i.- matter. 
This case, at that t • m*^
 t had involved the taking of depositions in 
1 . -....i 1992; pret i: •• -:•..-.. ••. .-.3. ii. * ......* . : < 1 : > 
day trial in October, 1992. It also included an appeal to ttie Utah 
Court of Appeals with hearings and motions connected th-r-w + V 
fur ther hearings on remand, submitting extensive proposed : i^a. :.g^ 
of fact and cone J us: ons C !..:.- r. 1 > second memorandum decision. 
Tr:- * »-.-•• ' w - ' ' ' 
accounting :.^a recently :-^  .*.• n< ^  .-A . deuce . n, i;.y, - , 
review of !::»-• depositions and **: t lie tr. XJ transcripr ^hows. 
however, that extei is: ve e ^  :i dence regard :i 1 ig a : ::oi :i 1 it:ii igs was a par t 
of Dori'i depositions >nd the ta.i; 
A R C P '"-'i^ vr: ir: r r? brief *"h^ t" money wa? spent for which there 
w 1.- . v :i dei ice . !'Tl "^  cl leek 
registers for both t ujk. accounts show where every penny of ARC'S 
money was spent: (E: : 74 ai id 75 ) ARC had possession of the check 
registers long before trial , Sy sc ::»i n accoui ite • :i for a] 1 money placed 
in the accounts it had access to and spent additional sums of its 
own f u n d s w h i c h c o 11 s t i 11 11 e s p a r t o f i t s c 1 a i m a g a i n s t A R C . (See 
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testimony of Neal M Sorensen and Marie Bagshaw, R. 523-824, Ex. 6-
17, 24-47, 52-55, 63, 65-66, 68, 69, 71-74, 76-77.) 
If ARC ran out of money to finish the project, that is simply 
a confession that it breached one of its responsibilities under the 
Management Agreement. (Ex. 1 and 75 at 3(a), 3(h), 5(c) 5(d), 
5(g) .) 
The evidence which ARC asserted as newly discovered or newly 
known is essentially the evidence that was before the Court at the 
time of the trial. Additionally, ARC has asserted that it has 
sustained consequential damages of approximately $9,000,000.00 that 
were not presented at the trial. (R. 1037, 1038). 
ARC'S motion to reopen was also correctly denied for the 
reason that it had ample opportunity to make an accounting and to 
argue the meaning of that accounting both at the trial and in its 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and failed to do 
so. 
Furthermore, Paragraph 13 of the Management Agreement, (Ex. 1 
and 75) specifically exempts Syscom from liability for 
consequential loss or damage. It states, 
"Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Management 
Agreement, SYSCOM shall not be liable to CELLCOM for any loss 
of damage of any nature incurred or suffered by CELLCOM in any 
way relating to or arising out of the act or default of 
SYSCOM, or any employee of SYSCOM, in the purported 
performance or nonperformance of this Management Agreement or 
any part hereof, except loss or damage to CELLCOM caused by 
SYSCOM's willful act, willful default, gross negligence or 
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gross misconduct under this Management Agreement to the extent 
to which the same is not recoverable by virtue of the 
insurance of CELLCOM. In no event shall SYSCOM be liable for 
CELLCOM's loss of profits and/or other consequential loss or 
damage, whether or not occasioned or caused by the act, 
default or negl igence of SYSCOM, nor shall SYSCOM be in any 
way liable for any act, default or negligence, willful or 
otherwise, of any other independent contractor employed for 
the purpose of providing services to CELLCOM. SYSCOM 
undertakes to use due care in the context of the available 
labor force in the selection of persons, if any, hired for the 
purpose of providing services to CELLCOM, but: SYSCOM shall 
have no obligation, responsibility or liability of any nature 
whatsoever for any act or omission, tortuous or otherwise, of 
any person so hired. Except as otherwise set forth above, 
SYSCOM shall nc* be liable for. and "ELLCOM shall] indemnify 
and he ":. d SYSCOM harmless from and against, any and all 
damage;.-, liabilities, losses, claims actions, suits, 
proceedings, costs or expenses -including reasonable billed 
attorneys' fees and expenses) of whatever kind and nature 
imposed on, incurred, by or asserted against SYSCOM in any way 
relating to or arising out of this Management Agreement or the 
design, development, construction, operation or management of 
f. f i; '•: r:. '• r 'W j v~f=* 1 i n p n o ! 1 n ] ; v r ^rpk r\ i r\ c; wc: t" prp i n t h e DRP]VfTT A P T7 A 
Further, i i A-:. • ] aims consequent id 1 carnages connected w; th 
its Pennsylvania operation.. s-ioj- won id N- -:J 'natter for f 11 inn of a 
new ..!.--;'•:. ; . :. t\-. :•• :/ . > :. . •; - • for e tl i€ (.' u-- , -o ..o-
such losses would ha\--: to have taken place a t er the filing of this 
Complaint and ccild *ot have been made r--• r \ of the trial even if 
There is ;;othm - fair about startinq -n . over again or; \ six 
year old case to n • " b-'-o*- - — a r onese'l *- into a position it 
wishes it could havt- ,.;>.;ta,n( . .^.. ... . ...u. 
Rule 5 9 or • ne "tah Rules of Civil Procedure, sets forth the 
groi mds *' -< - ii a II as £0] ] < in *s 
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(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new 
trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all 
or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; 
provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment 
if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend 
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings 
and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party 
making the application, which he could not, with 
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the 
trial. 
The law is clear that a trial court has no discretion to grant 
a new trial absent a showing of one of the grounds specified in the 
Rule 59a. Tangaro v. Marrero, 13 Utah 2d 290, 373 P.2d 390 (1962) . 
Absent a showing of at least one of the circumstances specified in 
Subdivision (a) of Rule 59, a trial court has no discretion to 
grant a new trial. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n v. Ultrasvstems, W. 
Constructors, Inc., 767 P.2d 125, 128 (Utah App. 1988); Schindler 
v. Schindler, 776 P. 2d 84, 89 (Utah App. 1989) . The law is further 
clear that a motion for a new trial or amended judgment cannot be 
based on facts occurring subsequent to the trial; newly discovered 
evidence must relate to facts which were in existence at the time 
of trial. In re Disconnection of Certain Territory, 668 P.2d 544, 
549 (Utah 1983) . A party is not entitled to a new trial where the 
evidentiary matters termed as new were reasonable and proper 
subjects of discovery and could have been obtained by the exercise 
of ordinary diligence. Powers v. Gene's Bldq. Materials, Inc., 567 
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facts occurring ofr - r:ai. Hancock v. Planned Dev. Corp, 9. 
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sufficient substance * hat there is reasonable like!! i tood, that with 
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 vre been a different resuic. !.; i e t . R ,
 f 735 p.2d 
ARC'S memoranda -no motions submit ted -u *::> time of its 
r. - ---™ r* -.f Rule 5 9 by 
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 : ,i,^./vt;^;u -ivi jence v*as in existence 
•i- ":.'" t'ime i!" * he trial ai: i -^- ~; : .\ developed after ne trial. In 
•• •' . • •- " ' . - - i::el ;i es oi :i "a 
recent account::;.; ; <, w> Zsiext , A;-; •, i nc'.. -now t h a t t h e 
c : a: med newly discovered evidence could nht have been discovered by 
:e: - - :i II d i nake any 
difference if i* ..:d .,ren aumi \: -u ui •.• • . . 
The eq:: i r i <:"rs dr •-: on the s i de of Sysco- Fa i r ness requi res 
til l a t til • . - : . . com 
its money for services rendered and materials supplied for more 
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than six years now while ARC has filed motions, made appeals, and 
engaged in other maneuvers to keep from paying its just debt. The 
practical effect of granting ARC'S motion would be to postpone for 
another four or five years a final conclusion to this matter. If 
an accounting was not completed at the time of the original trial, 
that was not the fault of Syscom. 
IV. SYSCOM IS ENTITLED TO ITS ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS AS 
AWARDED BY THE DISTRICT COURT. 
Paragraph 13 of the Management Agreement is a somewhat 
unusual, but all encompassing provision of the contract between the 
parties. It provides that ARC 
"shall indemnify and hold Syscom harmless from and against any 
and all damages, liabilities, losses, claims, actions, suits, 
proceedings, costs, or expenses", ("including reasonable 
billed attorneys fees and expenses") of what ever kind and 
nature imposed on, incurred by or asserted by Syscom in any 
way relating to or arising out of this Management Agreement or 
the design development construction operation or management of 
the non wire line cellular radio system in the permit area". 
This is not the usual attorney fee provision which states that 
a defaulting party or prevailing party shall pay the non-defaulting 
parties attorneys fees in the event of enforcement. This agreement 
drafted by ARC was specifically calculated to hold Syscom harmless 
from any claims or liabilities and to reimburse it for attorneys 
fees and expenses of "whatever kind and nature". It was agreed to 
by the parties and should be recognized now by the court that 
attorneys fees and expenses for small companies like Syscom can 
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negate the value of any judgment they may obtain in an action such 
as this. 
The parties further agreed in paragraph 14 of the Management 
Agreement that all disputes in connection with the Management 
Agreement would be settled by means of mandatory binding 
arbitration. ARC ignored that covenant to which it had agreed and 
filed this action against Syscom. Syscom is entitled to the 
benefit to its bargain embodied in paragraph 13 of the Management 
Agreement by being reimbursed for its attorneys fees and costs 
regardless of whether it is the prevailing party. 
Additionally, Section 38-1-18 Utah Code Annotated, part of the 
mechanics lien statute provides: 
In any action to enforce any lien under this chapter the 
successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable 
attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed 
as costs in the action. 
Syscom is the prevailing party at this time. The award of a 
Judgment against ARC favors Syscom. Under the lien statute, Syscom 
has prevailed as indicated by the trial court. It cannot be said 
in good faith that ARC has been the successful party in Syscom's 
attempt to foreclose its mechanics liens in this matter. The fact 
that ARC has employed every legal maneuver it could think to avoid 
paying Syscom for its services and materials contributed to put ARC 
in business should not be held against Syscom. 
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The court had before it affidavits, the testimony of counsel 
for ARC, and time records showing work performed to justify the 
attorneys fees. The trial court and this court should sustain the 
trial court in its conclusion that attorneys fees are due and 
owing. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should sustain the lower court's decision and award 
costs and attorneys fees on appeal. 
DATED this (3H~ day of December, 1996. 
McKEACHNIE & ALLRED, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
BY: 
BY: 
rleQ FT McKeachnie 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Gayle F. McKeachnie, attorney for Defendants/Appellees 
certifies that he served the attached BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES 
SYSTEMS COMMUNICATION CORPORATION AND NEAL M SORENSEN upon counsel 
by placing two true and correct copies thereon in an envelop 
addressed to: 
Mr. Andrew M. Morse 
Snow Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and deposited the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States Mail at Vernal, Utah, on the day 
of December, 1996. 
Gayle R. McKeachnie 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
w «*»v W W ! I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UNITAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN RURAL CELLULAR 
INC., a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. 
SYSTEMS COMMUNICATIONS 
CORPORATION, a Utah ; 
corporation, and NEAL 
M. SORENSEN, 
Defendants. 
SYSTEMS COMMUNICATIONS 
CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MOTOROLA, INC., 
Third-Party 
Defendant. 
| No. 910800064 CN 
DEPOSITION UPON ORAL EXAMINATION 
OF 
NEAL VL. SORENSEN 
Taken Pursuant to Notice and the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure 
Friday, May 1, 1992, 9:20 a.m. 
At the offices of: 
Gayle F. McKeachnie 
Attorney at Law 
363 E. Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 
By: Peggy Grover, R.P.R., CM., Notary Public 
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VERNAL, UTAH, FRIDAY, MAY 1, 1992, 9:30 A.M. 
NEAL M. SORENSEN, 
having first been duly and 
legally sworn, was examined 
and testified on his oath as 
follows: 
MR. SCHOW: Let the record show that this is the 
place and time set for the deposition of Mr. Neal Sorensen in 
the matter of American Rural Cellular, Inc., a Delaware 
corporation versus Systems Communications Corportion, and Neal 
M. Sorensen. The deposition is being held in the office of Mr. 
Gayle McKeachnie, and we appreciate his willingness to let us 
do it here. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SCHOW: Q. Would you please state your name 
for the record. 
A. Neal M. Sorensen. 
Q. And what is your address, Mr. Sorensen? 
A. 715 West 3300 North, Vernal, Utah. 
Q. Where are you currently employed? 
A. I work for a company called Geotech Services. 
Q. What do you do for Geotech? 
A. I am a contract technician to Chevron. 
Q. What are your duties as a contract technician? 
A. I maintain two-way radio equipment, microwave radio 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
equipment, supervisory control and data acquisition equipment, 
telephone equipment, computers, electronic communications 
equipment. 
Q. Are you currently associated with Systems 
Communications Corporation? 
A. Please clarify what you mean by associated. 
Q. What is your current relationship with Systems 
Communications Corporation? 
A. I hold no stock in Systems Communications 
Corporation. 
Q. Have you owned stock in the past? 
A. I have. 
Q. And up to what date did you own stock? 
A. I think in February we transferred that stock. 
Q. When you say "we". 
A. Me. I transferred my stock in February. 
Q. To? 
A. To an escrow account. 
Q. And what was the purpose of the escrow account? 
A. Until I was paid. Until the completed payments were 
made for that stock, it would be held in escrow. 
Q. What was the reason for your decision to sell your 
stock or transfer your stock? 
A. There were several reasons. Rod and I just felt 
that it was time for a change. I had another opportunity, 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
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business was slowing down. I think those were the main 
reasons. Reduce the overhead on the company. 
Q. And this new opportunity you mentioned is the 
Geotech situation you currently have? 
A. Yes. It is a good job. 
Q. We kind of started backwards here. I would like to 
go back and have you review for us, if you would, your 
educational background, first of all high school, and any post 
high school education you have had. 
A. I haven't had much, in fact, I don't think I hold 
any college credit. 
Q. Then tell us about the training that you have had, 
vocational, or technical training that you have had. 
A. I assume you just mean with regard to my present 
employment. 
Q. Any technical training that you have had. I would 
like to get an idea of your general background. 
A. I began working for a company here in Vernal called 
Industrial Communications, I don't know, some 16 years ago, 17 
years ago now maybe. The only training that I had had in this 
field was what I took in high school that was remotely 
related. At that time I received on the job training and 
attended a few seminars working for that company. Then I went 
to work for a company called Mack Communications and received 
on the job training and technical training on 
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